thesis statement on james madison

James Madison and the Bill of Rights

Written by: bill of rights institute, by the end of this section, you will:.

Explain the differing ideological positions on the structure and function of the federal government

Suggested Sequencing

This Narrative should be assigned to students at the beginning of their study of Chapter 4. This reading can be used in conjunction with the Actions of the First Congress Lesson or following the Lesson to reinforce main ideas.

In early 1787, when Virginia Congressman James Madison was preparing for the Constitutional Convention, he wrote an essay entitled “Vices of the Political System,” detailing the flaws of the Articles of Confederation. One of the main problems with the Articles, in Madison’s view, was that tyrannical majorities in the states passed unjust laws violating the rights of numerical minorities. He had seen the oppression of religious dissenters in Virginia and became the leading advocate for the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. But injustice was occurring in all the states. As a result, Madison drafted the Virginia Plan, which greatly strengthened the power of the central government and laid the groundwork for the debates at the Constitutional Convention.

James Madison as portrayed by Gilbert Stuart in about 1805-1807. Madison was a dominant force at the Constitutional Convention and took notes that have served as an indispensable source for historians, who call him the “Father of the Constitution.”

At the Constitutional Convention, Madison advocated for constitutional principles of separation of powers, checks and balances, bicameralism , and federalism, which would limit government and protect individual liberties. However, he lost one central feature of his plan of government – a national veto over state laws, meant to prevent majority tyranny in the states.

On September 12, 1787, during the last days of the Constitutional Convention, fellow Virginia delegate George Mason rose and proposed a bill of rights, a list of rights belonging to the people that government could not violate. The delegates were wrapping up their business and worried that a prolonged debate on a bill of rights could endanger the success of their project. Roger Sherman of Connecticut also reassured the convention that the states had their own bills of rights and so had no need for a national bill of rights. The convention unanimously rejected Mason’s idea.

When the Constitution was sent to the state conventions for ratification, the Anti-Federalists who were opposed to it agreed on the need for a bill of rights to protect the liberties of the people. Several Federalists, or those who supported the new Constitution, disagreed. On October 6, Pennsylvanian James Wilson delivered a speech at the state house in which he argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because the new national government had limited, enumerated (i.e., specified) powers and had no power to violate liberties in the first place. In Federalist Paper No. 84, Alexander Hamilton warned that a bill of rights could even be dangerous, because defining certain rights vaguely would leave them subject to misinterpretation or violation, where previously no such power had existed. Moreover, some important rights would be left out and therefore endangered. Most importantly, Hamilton argued that “the constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS” because of the principle of limited government.

During the ratification debate, Federalists in many states had to make compromises. Although they were able to prevent the addition of “conditional amendments” prior to ratification, they had to promise to pass a bill of rights after the Constitution had been ratified. Madison opposed even this and thought “the amendments are a blemish.”

Madison conducted an extensive correspondence over several months with his friend Thomas Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time. Jefferson lamented the absence of a bill of rights in the Constitution and asserted, “A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth.” Madison waffled on the issue. He did not believe the “omission a material defect.” In a republican form of government rooted upon popular sovereignty, the majority could act tyrannically by violating the rights of the minority. Among his several reasons for opposing a bill of rights was that such documents were often just “parchment barriers” that overbearing majorities violated in the states regardless of whether the written protections for minority rights existed. As he wrote in Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison also believed that a large republic would have many contending factions that would prevent a majority from violating the rights of minorities. Nevertheless, he began to change his mind.

Madison was deeply concerned about the continuing strength of the Anti-Federalists after ratification. Anti-Federalists were still calling for structural changes and a second constitutional convention to limit the powers of the national government and deny it power over taxation and the regulation of commerce. Madison feared this would lead to chaos and fought against it. He also sought greater consensus and harmony around constitutional principles by reaching out to the opponents of the new government. He ran in a hard-fought campaign against James Monroe for a seat in the House of Representatives and made a campaign promise to support a bill of rights, particularly an amendment protecting the liberty of conscience. Finally, Madison wrote President George Washington’s Inaugural Address, which indicated support for a bill of rights to be acted upon in the First Congress.

Representative Madison became the champion for a bill of rights in the First Congress, but the idea met a hostile reception. Most representatives and senators thought Congress had more important work to do setting up the new government or passing tax bills for revenue. Many thought the bill of rights was a “tub to the whale” or a distraction, like the empty tub sailors would use to draw away a whale’s attention. Madison was undeterred and dedicated himself to the cause of protecting the people’s liberties.

On June 8, 1789, dressed in black as always, Madison rose on the floor of the House to deliver a speech in favor of a bill of rights. His arguments were founded on the goal of a harmonious political order and the ideals of justice. A bill of rights would extinguish the apprehensions of Anti-Federalists and convince them of the “principles of amity and moderation” held by the other side, now prepared to fulfill a sacred promise made during the ratification debate. Rhode Island and North Carolina, which had withheld their ratification of the Constitution until a bill of rights was added, would also be welcomed into the union. Most importantly, the Bill of Rights would “expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution.”

The first U.S. Congress met in Federal Hall in New York City for one year before moving to Philadelphia in 1790.

Madison then skillfully guided the amendments through the Congress. He and his committee reconciled all the amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions and discarded any that would alter the structure of the Constitution or the new government. Limiting himself to those protecting essential liberties, Madison developed a list of nineteen amendments and a preamble. He wanted them to be woven into the text of the Constitution, not simply affixed to the end of the document as amendments, and he sought a key amendment to protect from violation by state governments religious freedom, a free press, and trial by jury. He lost both these provisions but prudentially and moderately continued to support the Bill of Rights he had proposed.

On August 24, the House sent seventeen amendments to the Senate after approving them by more than the required two-thirds margin. By September 14, two-thirds of the Senate had approved twelve amendments, removing the limitations on state governments. President Washington sent the amendments to the states, endorsing them even though the president did not have a formal role in their adoption.

Over the next two years, eleven states ratified the Bill of Rights to meet the three-fourths constitutional threshold, including North Carolina and Rhode Island. Virginia became the last state to ratify on December 15, 1791. The Bill of Rights fulfilled Madison’s goals of reconciling its opponents to the Constitution and protecting individual liberties. However, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment and later Supreme Court cases in the twentieth century reversed this decision and applied the Bill of Rights to the states through the principle known as “incorporation.”

Review Questions

1. Which delegate to the Constitutional Convention first proposed a bill of rights?

Thomas Jefferson
James Madison
George Mason
James Monroe

2. One of James Madison’s constitutional principles was rejected. This principle would have given

the Federal government a veto over state legislation
the Executive Branch more authority than the other two branches of government
more authority to the governor of each state
explicit rights to the people

3. After the submission of the Constitution to the states for ratification, James Madison’s greatest concern grew from

his fear of the growing divide between the North and South
the endless debate over the need for a bill of rights
the strength of resistance to the Constitution expressed by the Anti-Federalists
the passage of tax bills that would disproportionately harm the small states

4. Which individual helped changed James Madison’s opposition to a bill of rights?

George Washington

5. Alexander Hamilton’s major argument against a bill of rights was that

a specific list of rights could be misinterpreted and violated
it was too burdensome for the federal government to enforce
it would be abused and interpreted differently by the different states
the rights would be redundant because states already had their own bills of rights

6. One major reason James Madison initially believed a bill of rights was unnecessary was that

the United States would be broken into many factions and the majority could not violate the rights of the minority
individual rights were implied in the body of the Constitution
a bill of rights would give the people too much authority

7. Which of the following was not a reason that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention omitted adding a bill of rights to the original document?

Many delegates believed a bill of rights would be unnecessary because all the states had their own.
There was a strong belief that individual rights were implied in the document they had already created.
A debate over adding a bill of rights would have prolonged the Convention and could have endangered the work they were about to complete.
A bill of rights would have been next to impossible to enforce in a nation as large as the United States.

Free Response Questions

Explain James Madison’s evolving support for the Bill of Rights.
Describe the debate over the addition of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution.

AP Practice Questions

“IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. . . . The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights. Among other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked that the constitutions of several of the States are in a similar predicament. I add that New York is of the number. And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited admiration for its constitution, are among the most intemperate partisans of a bill of rights. To justify their zeal in this matter, they allege two things: one is that, though the constitution of New York has no bill of rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in favor of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance amount to the same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not expressed in it, are equally secured. To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the convention contains, as well as the constitution of this State, a number of such provisions.”

Publius (Alexander Hamilton), The Federalist Papers: No. 84 , 1788

1. The argument made by Publius in the excerpt

explains the need for a strong bill of rights in the Constitution
argues that a bill of rights would be too restrictive
argues there is no need for a bill of rights because the different states do not agree on what to include
argues that a bill of rights is implied in the body of the Constitution and is therefore unnecessary

2. Supporters of adding a bill of rights to the Constitution were most likely influenced by

the violations of the “Rights of Englishmen” at the hands of the British in the years before the American Revolution
the failure of the government to come to the aid of Massachusetts during Shays’ Rebellion
fear of the lack of authority in the central government
the inherent weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation

3. The concepts expressed in the Bill of Rights have most in common with the ideas of

the Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768
the Olive Branch Petition
the English Bill of Rights
the Declaration of Rights and Grievances published by the Stamp Act Congress

Primary Sources

Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist #84 . May 28, 1788. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0247

Madison, James. Letter to Thomas Jefferson. October 17, 1788. https://founders.archives.gov/?q=bill%20of%20rights%20Recipient%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Author%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22%20Period%3A%22Confederation%20Period%22&s=1511311111&r=27

Madison, James. “Speech in Congress on the Bill of Rights.” June 8, 1789. https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=001/llac001.db&recNum=221

Suggested Resources

Berkin, Carol. The Bill of Rights: The Fight to Secure America’s Liberties . New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015.

DeRose, Chris. Founding Rivals: Madison vs. Monroe: The Bill of Rights and the Election That Saved a Nation . Washington, DC: Regnery, 2011.

Goldwin, Robert A. From Parchment to Power: How James Madison Used the Bill of Rights to Save the Constitution . Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1997.

Labunski, Richard. James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Levy, Leonard W. Origins of the Bill of Rights . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

Rutland, Robert Allen. The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791 . Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983.

Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness

In our resource history is presented through a series of narratives, primary sources, and point-counterpoint debates that invites students to participate in the ongoing conversation about the American experiment.

The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 10.

Madison begins perhaps the most famous essay of The Federalist Papers by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions. Madison defines factions as groups of people who gather together to protect and promote their special economic interests and political opinions. Although these factions are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interest and infringe upon the rights of others.

Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact, the situation is so problematic that people are disillusioned with all politicians and blame the government for their problems. Consequently, any form of popular government that can deal successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it.

Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amounts of property, they will continue to fraternize with those people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions, but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property. Men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those of business owners. Governments must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but also must successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property.

To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man, so we must accept their existence and deal with their effects. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions.

The framers established a representative form of government: a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies (countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws) cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict.

If the new plan of government is adopted, Madison hopes that the men elected to office will be wise and good men, the best of America. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good for temporary conditions, but the opposite could happen. Men who are members of particular factions or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public offices will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but rather to guard against the rule of the mob.

In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. In this country, leaders of factions may be able to influence state governments to support unsound economic and political policies as the states, far from being abolished, retain much of their sovereignty. If the framers had abolished the state governments, then opponents of the proposed government would have had a legitimate objection.

The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capital, but in terms of safety and protection, they stand to gain the most from a strong national government.

Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandoning the idea of coming together in strength—after all, the states still have common interests. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."

James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of Hamilton's. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the states as active political organisms. He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic were set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, then these interests, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor. Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power. Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security. Rather, he wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself to break down the dichotomy of rich and poor, thereby guaranteeing both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."

It is also interesting to note that James Madison was the most creative and philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics in attendance at the Philadelphia Convention. His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular Constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787, was based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in 1787. But Madison's greatness as a statesman also rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience within the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations.

His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United States and its variety of interests constituted a guarantee of stability and justice under the new Constitution. When Madison made this prophecy, the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. It was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in 1752, that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay, Hume decried any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments" which seemed to serve imperfect men so well. Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth "is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world. " At the end of Hume's essay was a discussion that was of interest to Madison. The Scot casually demolished the Montesquieu small-republic theory; and it was this part of the essay, contained in a single page, that was to serve Madison in new-modeling a "botched" Confederation "in a distant part of the world." Hume said that "in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrate, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest." Hume's analysis here had turned the small-territory republic theory upside down: if a free state could once be established in a large area, it would be stable and safe from the effects of faction. Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic.

In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April 1787, eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Starting with the proposition that "in republican Government, the majority, however, composed, ultimately give the law," Madison then asks what is to restrain an interested majority from unjust violations of the minority's rights? Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general . . . good" second, "respect for character" and finally, religious scruples. After examining each in its turn Madison concludes that they are but a frail bulwark against a ruthless party.

When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America. Hume's work was admirably adapted to this purpose. It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. The facile domination of faction had been a commonplace in English politics for a hundred years, as Whig and Tory vociferously sought to fasten the label on each other. But the Scot, very little interested as a partisan and very much so as a social scientist, treated the subject therefore in psychological, intellectual, and socioeconomic terms. Throughout all history, he discovered, mankind has been divided into factions based either on personal loyalty to some leader or upon some "sentiment or interest" common to the group as a unit. This latter type he called a "Real" as distinguished from the "personal" faction. Finally, he subdivided the "real factions" into parties based on "interest, upon principle," or upon affection."

Hume spent well over five pages dissecting these three types; but Madison, while determined to be inclusive, had not the space to go into such minute analysis. Besides, he was more intent now on developing the cure than on describing the malady. He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence. The tenth Federalist reads" "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex ad oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good." It is hard to conceive of a more perfect example of the concentration of idea and meaning than Madison achieved in this famous sentence.

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The Federalist Papers Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

how are conflictstoo often decided in unstable government? Whose rights are denied when this happens?

In a typical non-democratic government with political instability, the conflicts are often decided by the person highest in power, who abuse powers or who want to seize power. Rival parties fight each other to the detriment of the country.

How Madison viewed human nature?

Madison saw depravity in human nature, but he saw virtue as well. His view of human nature may have owed more to John Locke than to John Calvin. In any case, as Saul K. Padover asserted more than a half-century ago, Madison often appeared to steer...

How arguable and provable is the author of cato 4 claim

What specific claim are you referring to?

Study Guide for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

About The Federalist Papers
The Federalist Papers Summary
The Federalist Papers Video
Character List

Essays for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

A Close Reading of James Madison's The Federalist No. 51 and its Relevancy Within the Sphere of Modern Political Thought
Lock, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers
Comparison of Federalist Paper 78 and Brutus XI
The Paradox of the Republic: A Close Reading of Federalist 10
Manipulation of Individual Citizen Motivations in the Federalist Papers